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*I.C.C.L.R. 136  The dispute between shippers and carriers on the point of liability for the 
shipment of dangerous goods has been the subject-matter of much controversy ever since 
the decision in Brass v. Maitland1 some 140 years ago. In particular, where cargo has been 
shipped in circumstances where neither the shipper nor the carrier has the means of 
knowledge of the dangerous nature of the cargo, the question arises as to who should bear 
the risk.2 This controversy has recently been the subject-matter of discussion in the House 
of Lords in Effort Shipping Co. Ltd v. Linden Management SA,3 where their Lordships, inter 
alia, have finally put an end to the matter by confirming the majority decision in Brass v. 
Maitland. Furthermore, in so far as those cases where the Hague Rules apply, their 
Lordships have rejected the argument that Article IV, r. 6 is qualified by r. 3 of the same 
Article.4 The latter point has been the subject-matter of much confusion both in the United 
States and England. This article reviews the decision in Effort Shipping Co. Ltd and also 
critically examines the nature of liability both at common law and under the Hague Rules. 
 EFFORT SHIPPING CO. LTD v. LINDEN MANAGEMENT SA  
The proceedings in the House of Lords involved an appeal from a decision of the Court of 
Appeal on January 30, 1996 which itself dismissed an appeal from a decision of Longmore 
J. on March 29, 1994 who gave judgment for the plaintiff carriers, Effort Shipping Company 
Ltd. The relevant facts are as follows. On November 18, 1990 the appellant, Linden 
Management SA, shipped a cargo of ground nut extraction at Dakar, Senegal, for carriage 
to Rio Haina in the Dominican Republic. The cargo was loaded under a bill of lading 
incorporating the Hague Rules. The vessel was also carrying wheat pellets for carriage to 
San Juan, Puerto Rico and Rio Haina. Both the shipper and the carrier were unaware that 
the cargo of ground nut extraction was infested with Kharpa beetle at the time of shipment. 
There was no danger of the infestation spreading to the wheat but nevertheless rendered 
the vessel and its entire cargo subject to exclusion from countries where the cargo was to 
be discharged. Having discharged part of the wheat cargo at San Juan, the vessel 
proceeded to the Dominican Republic where she was put in quarantine. After two 
fumigations it was ordered to leave the Republic for San Juan. At San Juan the United 
States authorities ordered the carriers to return the cargo to its country of origin or dump 
it at sea. The carriers dumped the whole cargo, including the wheat cargo, at sea and after 
a further two fumigations was allowed, with a delay of some ten weeks, to load her next 
charter in the United States. 
The primary question arising on these facts was where should loss fall. It was argued on 
behalf of the carriers that they were entitled to recover damages for delay to the vessel 
caused by the shipment of dangerous goods by the shipper and also the cost of fumigation. 
This claim, it was argued, could be made either under Article IV, r. 6 of the Hague Rules, or 
under the implied common law obligation on a shipper not to ship dangerous goods. In 
considering liability under both heads the House of Lords held that such liability was not 
fault-based. On the facts, even though the shipper had no knowledge of the dangerous 
nature of the ground nut extract, his liability was strict. The nature of liability under these 
obligations and the manner in which the House of Lords addressed them is discussed 
below. 
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 THE IMPLIED COMMON LAW OBLIGATION  
It is appropriate to discuss the implied common law obligation first. A shipper impliedly 
undertakes that he will not ship goods likely to involve danger without first communicating 
to the shipowner the nature of the danger. No obligation to notify the shipowner will arise 
where the shipowner ought to have been aware of the dangerous nature of the goods.5 
Thus, in Brass v. Maitland,6 bleaching powder containing chloride of lime was shipped but 
during the voyage damaged other cargo as a result of corrosion of the casks in which 
shipment was taking place. The court held that it was a good defence that the shipowners 
knew that the casks contained bleaching powder, furthermore, had the means of knowing 
and reasonably might and could and ought to have known that it contained chloride of lime. 
The shipowners had the means of judging the adequacy of the casks and it was plainly 
negligence on their behalf in storing the bleaching powder where it would cause damage to 
other cargo. 
On the question of neither party having knowledge of the dangerous nature of the cargo, 
Lord Campbell commented that, “it seems much more just and expedient that, although 
*I.C.C.L.R. 137  they were ignorant of the dangerous qualities of the goods, or the 
insufficiency of packing, the loss occasioned by the dangerous nature of the goods and the 
insufficient packaging must be cast upon the shippers than the shipowners.”7 On the other 
hand, there was a powerful dissenting judgment by Crompton J. who felt that the duty did 
not extend to those cases where the shippers had no means of knowing that the goods 
were dangerous and were not guilty of negligence. “It seems very difficult that the shipper 
can be liable for not communicating what he does not know I entertain great doubt whether 
either the duty or the warranty extends beyond the cases where the shipper has 
knowledge, or means of knowledge, of the dangerous nature of the goods when shipped or 
where he has been guilty of some negligence as shipper, as by shipping without 
communicating danger, which he had the means of knowing and ought to have 
communicated.”8 
Crompton J.'s powerful dissenting judgment in Brass v. Maitland did leave the decision 
somewhat doubtful. Indeed, this view was supported by a leading authority, Abbott's 
Merchant Ships and Seamen, where the authors of the text wrote that the views of 
Crompton J. were more in accordance with subsequent authorities.9 More recently, in the 
United States a similar view was expressed in Sucrest Corp. v. M/V Jennifer.10 In Effort 
Shipping Co. Ltd, Lord Lloyd upheld the majority decision in Brass v. Maitland, although the 
reasons for doing so are not entirely clear. Lord Lloyd's approach to the matter was 
somewhat brief and without reference to many authorities or a critical analysis of the 
decision in Brass v. Maitland itself. In the end, Lord Lloyd held: 
The dispute between the shippers and the carriers on this point is a dispute which has been 
rumbling on for well over a century. It is time for your Lordships to make a decision one 
way or the other. In the end that decision depends on whether the majority decision in 
Brass v. Maitland should now be overruled. I am of the opinion, that it should not. I agree 
with the majority in that case and would hold that the liability of a shipper for shipping 
dangerous goods at common law, when it arises, does not depend on the knowledge or the 
means of knowledge that the goods are dangerous.11 
It is very difficult to ascertain the reasons why the decision in Brass v. Maitland should have 
been upheld. Lord Lloyd only referred to incidental advantages in retaining the majority 
view in Brass v. Maitland, such as consistency with the liability under the Hague Rules. 
Whilst the House of Lords may have made a decision one way, the decision does leave 
some unresolved issues. The first is whether the retention of the ruling in Brass v. Maitland 
is necessarily consistent with the nature of liability under the Hague Rules. The second 
issue concerns the extent to which the decision in Brass v. Maitland can be taken as 
sufficient authority for strict liability. These matters are discussed below. 
 DANGEROUS GOODS AND THE HAGUE RULES  
Express provision for the carriage of dangerous goods is found in Article IV, r. 6 of the 
Hague Rules. 
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Goods of an inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature to the shipment whereof the 
carrier master or agent of the carrier, has not consented, with knowledge of their nature 
and character, may at any time before discharge be landed at any place or destroyed or 
rendered innocuous by the carrier without compensation, and the shipper of such goods 
shall be liable for all damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising out or resulting 
from such shipment. 
If any goods such goods shipped with such knowledge and consent shall become a danger 
to the ship or cargo, they may in like manner be landed at any place or destroyed or 
rendered innocuous by the carrier without liability on the part of the carrier except to 
general average, if any. 
Article IV, r. 6 envisages two types of situations. In the first place, the carrier's consent to 
the shipment has been obtained in ignorance of the inflammable, explosive or dangerous 
nature of the goods. In this case the carrier is entitled to land or destroy the goods without 
compensation to the shipper. The shipper is liable for all loss arising directly or indirectly 
from such shipment. The second situation deals with the shipment of cargo with knowledge 
and consent of the carrier but which subsequently becomes dangerous. The carrier is 
entitled to take the same measure to avoid the danger as in the first situation, however, in 
this case the shipper is not liable for any loss. The carrier can take action to avoid the 
danger without liability to the carrier except by way of general average. 
Although r. 6 is straightforward enough, two questions which have caused the court 
problems are, “what is the meaning of dangerous goods?” and secondly, “what is the effect 
of Article IV, r. 3 on r. 6?” Article IV, r. 3 states: 
The shipper will not be responsible for loss or damage sustained by the carrier or the ship 
arising or resulting from any cause without, act, fault or neglect of the shipper, his agent or 
his servants. 
The question arises as to whether r. 3 modifies liability under r. 6 into a fault-based one. 
 HAGUE RULES AND THE DEFINITION OF DANGEROUS GOODS  
Although the Article IV, r. 6 speaks of “goods of an inflammable, explosive or dangerous 
nature”, the common law cases have interpreted the word “dangerous” in a broad manner. 
Goods may be dangerous even if they are not physically dangerous. Thus, goods may be 
dangerous if they are insufficiently packed thereby causing the cargo to leak and damage 
other cargo.12 In Mitchell, Cotts v. Steel13 on the question of shipment of cargo which 
renders the voyage illegal, or which might involve the ship in danger of delay, Atkin J. 
commented, it “is precisely analogous to the shipment of a dangerous cargo which might 
cause the destruction of the ship”.14 
 *I.C.C.L.R. 138  In those cases where dangerous cargo has been specifically described, 
such as acids, explosives and so on, and then reference is made to the words “other 
dangerous cargo”, the question arises as to whether such words are to be construed 
ejusdem generis.15 Article IV, r. 6 refers to “goods of an inflammable, explosive or 
dangerous nature”. Wilson writes, “[R] 6 appears somewhat narrow in scope than its 
common law counterpart, its application probably being restricted to goods which are 
physically dangerous, since the word ‘dangerous’ in this context must presumably be 
construed eiusdem generis with ‘inflammable’ and ‘explosive’.”16 In Effort Shipping Co. 
Ltd, Lord Lloyd of Berwick approached the matter entirely on the basis of the common law 
cases, thereby rejecting construction ejusdem generis.17 His Lordship referred to Chandris 
v. Isbrandsten-Moller Co. Inc.18 where Devlin J. had to consider whether turpentine was a 
prohibited cargo within the meaning of a charter party for cargo of “lawful merchandise, 
excluding acids, explosives, arms, ammunitions or other dangerous cargo”. In rejecting the 
ejusdem generis rule applying automatically in the construction of documents, Devlin J. 
went on to state, “it seems to me that the only reason why the owner is objecting to acids, 
explosives, arms or ammunition is because they are dangerous, and that being so he may 
be presumed to have the same objection to all other dangerous cargo.”19 In this respect 
Lord Lloyd held that, although the infested ground nut cargo had no risk of spreading to the 
wheat cargo, it was physically dangerous to the wheat cargo in that the dumping of the 
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wheat cargo at sea was a natural consequence of the shipment of the infested ground nut 
cargo. 
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE IV, R. 6 AND R. 3  
It has already been seen that although Article IV, r. 6 governs the shipment of dangerous 
goods, r. 3 makes it clear that liability of the shipper is fault-based. So whilst the shipment 
of dangerous goods allows the carrier to take the preventative measures in r. 6, is the 
shipper to incur liability in those cases where he is not at fault, as for instance, where he 
has no knowledge of the dangerous nature of the cargo? The answer to this primarily rests 
on whether r. 6 can be treated as a free-standing provision or whether it is truly qualified 
by r. 3. This, being the more problematic question, has attracted two different sets of 
views. The first view is that taken in the United States, where writers and judges have 
concluded that liability is qualified by r. 3 thereby being fault-based. The second view, 
expressed obiter in a series of English decisions, suggests that liability is exactly the same 
as that under common law, that is, strict.20 
It has often been argued that r. 6 is qualified by r. 3, thereby restricting the shipper's 
liability for the shipment of dangerous goods to those instances where he is at fault. In one 
leading English authority,21 Mustill J. thought that the United States authorities decided 
the matter in favour of shippers.22 This is supported by Wilford, Coghlin and Kimball who 
express in their text that r. 6 is clearly qualified by r. 3.23 Although the authorities referred 
to in coming to this conclusion do not directly address the question of the relationship 
between r. 6 and r. 3,24 it may well be right since the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1936 is regarded as a negligence-based statute.25 In Serrano v. U.S. Lines Co.,26 the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Article IV, r. 3 
had laid down a general principle of non-liability of the shipper in the absence of fault. The 
case, however, did not refer to r. 6 since there was no question of dangerous goods on the 
facts. In General, SA v. P. Consorcio Pesquero del Peru SA,27 where goods had been found 
to be dangerous, there was no need to discuss the relationship between Article IV, r. 6 and 
r. 3, since the carrier had consented to the carriage of the cargo which they ought to have 
known would cause damage. 
In Effort Shipping Co. Ltd, the House of Lords unanimously held that Article IV, r. 6 was not 
qualified by r. 3. The principal judgments were delivered by Lord Lloyd and Lord Steyn, 
although arriving at the same conclusion on different grounds. Lord Lloyd treated the 
matter as purely one of construction of the Hague Rules. In his opinion the United States 
authorities simply did not decide the specific issue as to whether Article IV, r. 6 was 
qualified by r. 3.28 Treating the matter as one of construing Article IV, r. 6 Lord Lloyd went 
on to explain: 
The first half of the first sentence of Article IV, r. 6 gives the carrier the right to destroy or 
render innocuous dangerous goods which have been shipped without his knowing their 
dangerous nature. Obviously that right cannot be dependent in any way on whether the 
shipper has knowledge of the dangerous nature of the goods. Yet the sentence continues, 
without a break, “and the shipper of such goods shall be liable.” It is natural to read the two 
halves of the first sentence as being two sides of the same coin. If so, then the shipper's 
liability for shipping dangerous goods cannot be made to depend on the state of his 
knowledge, his liability is not so confined to cases where he is at fault.29 
In contrast, Lord Steyn, having regarded that the United States authorities did decide the 
matter in favour of shippers, so that Article IV, r. 6 was qualified by r. 3, went on to decide 
the matter purely from what may be described as a contextual aspect. In his view it was 
important to examine the position in England and the United States before the Hague Rules 
were introduced. With reference to a number *I.C.C.L.R. 139  of English authorities30 
Lord Steyn concluded that the position in both jurisdictions had been clearly established 
before the Hague Rules31 and that position, strict liability of the shipper, was clearly 
understood by the framers of the Rules. If they wished to alter this position of strict liability 
they could have done so more appropriately, Lord Steyn commented: 
What would the framers of the Hague Rules have done if collectively they had been minded 
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to adopt the step of reversing the dominant theory of shippers' liability for the shipment of 
dangerous goods? There is really only [one] realistic answer: they would have expressly 
provided that shippers are only liable in damages for the shipment of dangerous goods if 
they knew or ought to have known of the dangerousness of the goods. In that event the 
three parts of article IV, r. 6 would have to be recast to make clear that the shippers' actual 
or constructive knowledge was irrelevant to the carriers' right to land dangerous cargo but 
a condition precedent to the liability of the shippers for damages in the second part.32 
Thus, in approaching the matter from a contextual approach, it was clear that Article IV, r. 
6 was a free-standing provision which retained the strict liability rule established in the 
common law cases. 
 IS STRICT LIABILITY RULE APPROPRIATE?  
In dismissing the shippers' appeal in Effort Shipping Company Ltd, the House of Lords have 
finally put to rest one of the most powerful dissenting judgments in the common law. There 
may be much to be said for Lord Campbell's view in Brass v. Maitland that, where neither 
party has the means of knowledge of the dangerous nature of the goods, the issue is purely 
one of the allocation of risk. However, whilst the House of Lords has refused to overrule the 
decision in Brass v. Maitland, there are a number of problems which still remain. It may 
well be appropriate to argue that in so far as English Law is concerned, what the House of 
Lords has done is to introduce a degree of consistency between the implied common law 
obligation not to ship dangerous goods and the Hague Rules. Yet, in coming to this 
conclusion the reasoning behind the arguments and justifications needs a little more 
careful analysis. There are a number of grounds on which the decision of the House of Lords 
can be questioned. 
In the first place, let us go back to the decision in Brass v. Maitland. Was this really an 
authority for the view that there was an absolute obligation on the shipper not to ship 
dangerous goods without first informing the carrier? Furthermore, was the absolute 
obligation not to ship dangerous goods without prior notice equivalent to strict liability? It 
must be remembered that in Brass v. Maitland the facts of the case did not concern the 
situation of neither party having no knowledge of the dangerous nature of the goods. Lord 
Campbell held it to be a good defence that the shipowners knew that the casks contained 
bleaching powder, and had the means of knowing that it contained chloride of lime which 
could thereby be dangerous to other cargo. Whilst it is clearly settled that Crompton J. 
thought that the duty did not extend to cases where the shipper had no knowledge of the 
dangerous nature of the goods, did Lord Campbell go so far as saying liability was strict? It 
is doubtful that Lord Campbell meant that the duty not to ship dangerous goods was strict. 
There is nothing in his judgment to suggest that liability extended to the case where the 
shipper had no knowledge of the dangerous nature of the goods. The duty is only absolute 
in so far as the shipper has knowledge or ought to have knowledge. If this is the case, then 
the knowledge needs to be communicated unless, of course, the carrier ought to have 
known. The aim of the rule appears to apply to those cases where the shipper has 
knowledge of the dangerous nature of the goods but these may not become apparent to 
the shipper because of packaging or because of the specific nature of the goods which the 
shipper alone has the means of knowing that they are dangerous. In all the passages in the 
judgment of Lord Campbell in Brass v. Maitland, the presumption is that the shipper has 
knowledge or ought to have known. Consider the following passages of Lord Campbell's 
judgment in Brass v. Maitland : 
The defendants, and not the plaintiffs, must suffer, if from the ignorance of the defendants 
a notice was not given to the plaintiffs, which the plaintiffs were entitled to receive, and 
from the want of this notice a loss has arisen which must fall either on the plaintiffs or on 
the defendants. I therefore hold the third plea to the bad.33 
It seems to me much more just and expedient that although they were ignorant of the 
dangerous quality of the goods the loss occasioned by the dangerous quality of the goods 
should be cast upon the shippers than upon the shipowners.34 
The word “ignorance” indicates a deliberate course of action as where the shipper simply 
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fails to pay any attention to the dangerous nature of the cargo. It is doubtful whether Lord 
Campbell was considering those cases where the shipper simply has no means of knowing 
that they are dangerous. In this respect there is much to be said for Crompton J.'s view 
that, “supposing that hay or cotton should be shipped, apparently in a fit state, and not 
dangerous to knowledge of the shippers or shipowners, but really being then in a 
dangerous state, from a tendency to heat, are the shippers to be liable for the 
consequences of fire from heating of such goods”?35 Related to this argument is the 
question of notice; how can notice be given without knowledge? Lord Campbell treats the 
matter as one of given notice, yet notice requires knowledge, whether constructive or 
actual, of the relevant facts. Furthermore, even if one examines the relevant authorities 
used by Lord Campbell in Brass v. Maitland, there is nothing in those authorities to suggest 
that liability extends to cases where the shipper has no knowledge of the dangerous nature 
of the goods nor has the means of ascertaining the same fact. The use of the word “notice” 
is clearly important in understanding that the nature of liability only extends to giving 
notice and such notice can only be given when there is some fact known or ought to be 
known to the shipper. Lord Campbell referred to Lord Tenterden's Treatise on *I.C.C.L.R. 
140  Shipping,36 but no reference was made to the case of a shipper having no knowledge 
of the dangerous nature of the goods. 
The second problem with the conclusion reached in Effort Shipping Co. Ltd is the lack of 
uniformity in interpretation of the Hague Rules. If we are to accept that the rule in the 
United States is that Article IV, r. 6 is qualified by r. 3, then we have two different 
interpretations of the Hague Rules which is clearly contrary to the principles of uniformity 
in the interpretation of an international convention. There may be much to be said about 
Lord Lloyd's approach that the dispute between Article IV, r. 6 and r. 3 is a matter of 
construction. On the other hand, Lord Steyn's contextual approach to the matter needs to 
be approached cautiously. It is not altogether clear why the rules and practices of the 
shipping world some 140 years ago should be used as the important indicia for the 
interpretation and adequacy of a rule today. We are often reminded by the then 
Honourable Mr Justice Devlin, who, commenting on the relationship between commercial 
law and commercial practice, wrote: 
in truth it is only with much effort that law and practice upon any subject can be kept 
together, and that is because, though they have the same origin, they are in their motions 
attracted by different objects. Rigidity and a regular pattern are pleasing to the legal mind, 
and so soon as he can the lawyer sets up a system of principles and rules from which he is 
reluctant to depart. He may start close to his subject, but because it is alive, illogical and 
contrary, it is likely to slip and slither out of the pattern he devises for it. The danger in any 
branch of law is that it ossifies.37 
One of the immediate consequences of the different views taken in the United States and 
England is the effect on general average. If the approach is taken that liability for the 
shipment for dangerous goods is fault-based, then the shipper's liability for the shipment of 
dangerous goods without knowledge would only restrict his liability to general average. In 
this instance, his marine insurance policy will provide for this contingency. In the case of 
strict liability, he will be entirely responsible for damages for the entire loss caused by the 
shipment of dangerous goods as in Effort Shipping Co. itself. In this respect, there is also 
the argument that the strict liability of the shipper not to ship dangerous goods produces an 
imbalance between the rights and duties of the shipper and carrier. 
 CONCLUSION  
The English law position regarding the shipment of dangerous cargo is made absolutely 
clear by the House of Lords in Effort Shipping Co. Ltd. Liability is not fault-based and is not 
dependent on knowledge or the means of knowledge in so far as the shipper is concerned. 
Liability is the same for the purposes of the common law and the Hague Rules. Whilst the 
House of Lords may have put to rest a dispute between shippers and carriers on the point 
of liability for the shipment of dangerous cargo, it still leaves behind a number of 
unresolved matters. In so far as the Hague Rules are concerned it remains to be seen 
whether the approach taken by the House of Lords is necessarily consistent with the 
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interpretation of the Rules in other jurisdictions, most notably, the United States. The 
United States courts have treated the matter as one of fault rather than strict liability. 
Furthermore, the strict liability approach does produce an imbalance between the rights 
and duties of the shipper and carrier. Whilst Crompton J.'s powerful dissenting judgment 
has been finally put to rest, it is unfortunate that it has been done so without much 
recourse to what was actually being said by Crompton J. and Campbell J. in the 
140-year-old decision in Brass v. Maitland. 
I.C.C.L.R. 1998, 9(5), 136-140 
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